Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming General

Gration back to the Foreign Relations Committee.

The United States has long been invested in helping to stabilize

war-torn Sudan. We have been engaged in this problem because it

has national security implications and because we have a moral interest

in working to prevent humanitarian disasters and genocide.

Sudan has been fractured by economic and power-sharing disputes

between ethnic groups, as well as relentless violence upon

civilians. Conditions there brought a U.S. declaration of ongoing

genocide and an International Criminal Court indictment of President

al Bashir.

The death toll of the North-South conflict and the graphic

scorched-earth strategy in Darfur also elicited remarkable grassroots

activism in the United States. Along with like-minded

nations, we’ve achieved some success in preventing military escalation

and protecting millions of people at risk in Darfur and the

South.

But a peace agreement in Darfur is distant and clouded by uncertainty

surrounding the outcome of the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement process. Failure of the peace agreement between North

and South could have catastrophic consequences for all of Sudan.

In testimony earlier this year, ADM Dennis Blair, the Director

of National Intelligence, said, ‘‘A number of countries in Africa and

Asia are at significant risk for a new outbreak of mass killing.

Among these countries, a new mass killing or genocide is most

likely to occur in Southern Sudan.’’

Admiral Blair’s stark assessment was prompted by evidence that

the parties are moving toward conflict, rather than establishing the

foundation for a sustainable peace. Each side is arming itself with

far more lethal equipment than was deployed during the North-

South civil war. This weaponry is being purchased with the income

from oil that has flowed to both sides since the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement was signed. These military expenditures have

come at the expense of basic services and infrastructure for the

people of Sudan. Rather than conclude agreements on wealth sharing

of the demarcation of borders, as called for in the peace

agreement, Khartoum and Juba appear to be consolidating their

ability to contest oil-producing areas along the proposed border.

Neighboring countries have begun to organize their military postures

for potential instability on the borders with Sudan.

Most observers agree that South Sudan is poorly equipped to

govern its territory and lacks capacity to provide for its inhabitants.

International capacity-building efforts, including training

security forces and building a functioning capital city in Juba, are

ongoing, but insufficient. Moreover, during the last 12 months, violence

between ethnic groups in South Sudan has reportedly killed

3,000 people and displaced more than 400,000.

As international attention to the North-South conflicts increases,

Darfur risks being relegated to a lesser priority. This may suit the

Khartoum regime and its proxies, as well as the myriad criminal

elements operating in the Darfur region. Consequently, international

vigilance toward Darfur should be heightened.

Although the mortality rate across Darfur has dropped, some 3

million people remain displaced and at risk. Through United States

efforts, several expelled aid agencies have been able to return to

Darfur, but the safety net for Darfur’s displaced millions remains

tenuous.

The United Nations hybrid peacekeeping mission with the African

Union continues to lack adequate helicopter support to respond

to threats to civilians across vast distances.

Given these complex circumstances, United States efforts related

to Sudan must be fully resourced, and the administration must be

speaking with one voice.

Last July, during General Gration’s testimony before our committee,

he identified several staffing needs. I look forward to hearing

from him today about whether these needs have been met and

whether any additional resources are required for this problem. I

also look forward to his assessments of the prospects for negotiations,

as well as United States options in the event of escalating

conflict.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.

General Gration, the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement, as we understand it, was a complex series of agreements.

Can you describe the other arrangements that are often

lumped together as a ‘‘complex series of agreements’’ that are a

part of this CPA?

Right.

And that has to happen through the Sudanese——

Parliament.

I see.

Now, when you use the phrase ‘‘We will need to

do these things,’’ are you speaking about the United States? Are

you speaking about the United States plus Norway? The United

Kingdom? Other African states? If you were asked to describe the

organization of the responsible parties, how would you respond to

that?

But, as you suggest, somebody really has to lead

this. The importance of negotiations between officials from the

North and South are obvious. But, even then, someone in the South

or the North would have to pull together a team designated to talk

to other parties.

The question I’m trying to reach is, Do you and your staff have

the ability to liaise with outside actors? For example, you mentioned

ISIS, the international group that work on elections. Can

you call them in and say, ‘‘You know, we really need to have application

by your folks now so that people understand the election

procedures’’?

Hypothetically, if a referendum was held and it

was deemed very clear that the result was independence and independence

was subsequently declared, at that point, who, physically,

in the South, takes charge? In other words, if there is to be the

negotiation, first of all, on the building of the institutions, quite

apart from dealings with the North, who, physically, is empowered

by this type of result of a referendum in Sudan to do something?

He’d be recognized, clearly, because of the previous

election.

Yes.

How many people do you have on your staff supporting

you in your role as special envoy to Sudan? For instance,

with regard to the Pakistan situation, as things are improvised,

maybe a staff of 30 or 40 people have been cobbled together. What

sort of a group do you have?

Well, that’s good news.

Thank you.